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Introduction
WHAT IS PHENOMENOLOGY?
The phenomenological philosophy of the 20th Century was founded by Edmund Husserl on a transcendental basis. But, from quite early on, the development of phenomenological philosophy moved in at least two, quite different, directions. On the one hand, and in what might be called a lateral direction, the methods of transcendental phenomenology have since been applied to an ever increasing range of topics -- time, space, causality, logic, mathematics, scientific methodology, aesthetics, theology, psychology, sociology -- to name only a few. On the other hand, and in what might be called a vertical direction, phenomenology has sought to transform itself from a methodology into a fully fledged philosophy, an ontological philosophy or a philosophy of existence. In reaction to the transcendental bias of Husserl's philosophy, Heidegger laid the foundations for an alternative, ontological phenomenology. In response to Heidegger's attempt to establish an ontological phenomenology on a monistic basis, a basis which would permit no reference to 'consciousness', to 'interiority' or to 'subjectivity', Sartre took the liberty of treating the cogito as a point of departure for an ontological phenomenology founded on the two categories of 'being' and 'nothingness'. Finally, Merleau-Ponty has attempted to bring ontology into closer proximity with the human sciences by adopting the category of embodiment as the foundation for a phenomenology of perception.
The transformation of transcendental phenomenology into an ontological philosophy was motivated by the desire to establish, once for all, a unifying ground for all further phenomenological researches. Unfortunately, in his effort to establish an alternative basis for phenomenological philosophy, Heidegger only succeeded in confusing the distinction between transcendental and ontological phenomenology, or rather, of collapsing the former into the latter. 'With regard to its subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of the being of entities -- ontology,' he tells us in that section of his Introduction devoted to the Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology. It is this failure to distinguish and so to clearly demarcate the respective spheres of transcendental and ontological phenomenology which remains the single greatest obstacle standing in the way of any further progress in phenomenological philosophy. So far from being in possession of a clearer idea of the scope and nature of phenomenological philosophy, we find ourselves forced to reiterate the very question with which Merleau-Ponty opened his own Phenomenology of Perception, the question: What is Phenomenology?
Should the attempt to move beyond the transcendental framework of Husserl's phenomenology in the direction of an ontological philosophy be given up in favour of a return to the unity of a method? Or is it indeed possible to re-establish phenomenological philosophy on a new basis, one which will permit a reconciliation and an integration of the various philosophies which have been developed? In order to be in a position to answer these questions, we need to consider whether all previous attempts to develop a phenomenological philosophy might not have been vitiated by some common limitation the removal of which would open the way to a new initiative.
Transcendental philosophy is a philosophy which seeks to situate itself upon a 'higher', transcendental plane with a view to bringing to light certain a priori structures which are supposed to account for the objectivity of the object. Objective reality forms the starting point for any transcendental investigation, which must then be resituated upon a properly transcendental plane in order to be in a position to make explicit those very a priori structures which must already have been implicit in the prior construction of an objective reality. Thus the movement of withdrawal (reduction) and return (constitution) which characterizes transcendental philosophy is not to be presented as a movement of being but as a movement strictly confined to the process of analysis. The assumption of a transcendental stance is not one which transforms the subject in its very being but rather one which simply makes it possible for the subject to bring to light those constitutive operations without which there could not have been an objective reality in the first place. We shall call the type of philosophical investigation which brings such fundamental structures to light in this fashion -- 'static'.
In his principal treatise, Being and Time, Heidegger specifically sought to move beyond the confines of a static phenomenology. But if, in the second part of his treatise, he does temporalize the fundamental structures first disclosed in the first part, this temporalization still remains within the limits of the static analytic effected in the first part. Even if time is explicated as the horizon for an understanding of being, and even if, therefore, the task of interpreting being does include working out the temporality of being, this temporalization still never goes the lengths of an understanding of the movement of becoming. For this reason, any theory which, in seeking to explicate the temporality of being, nevertheless remains within the static configuration established by a prior analytic of being will be entitled -- 'dynamic'.
We know that in the later years of his life, and partly due to the inspiration of Heidegger, Husserl set about the development of what he called a 'genetic' phenomenology. But so far from representing a break with the method of a static analysis, this so-called genetic phenomenology only succeeded in perpetuating the very method which it sought to surpass, this time in the form of an archaeological disclosure of the sedimented structures originally laid down in the course of experience. For the enquiry back into ever more primordial levels of experience achieves no more than a regressive disclosure of what is already simultaneously co-present, though covered over through the very process of sedimentation, and so, once again, fails to move beyond the confines of a static analytic. But if it is only possible to undertake an archaeological excavation of sedimented structures because the levels so disclosed were originally laid down in the inverse order, if, in this sense, a re-construction is only possible on the basis of an original construction then, in principle, an alternative method of exposition springs to mind, that, namely, of laying out the connection of the several levels in the order in which they were originally laid down. Inasmuch as an archaeological regression is transformed into a teleological progression of this kind, the archaeological levels so disclosed will become the several stages of a genesis which is no longer static in character. Such a teleological genesis will move beyond the static configuration of an archaeological investigation for the simple reason that the stages so exposed will not be simultaneously co-present but will be successively instantiated in the course of the genesis.
How can the utilization of a genetic methodology assist in the task of unifying the diversity of phenomenological philosophies which have been developed on an ontological basis? Quite simply, by furnishing a general framework in the overall context of which these different positions can be situated as so many stages in the genesis of consciousness itself. But, before the work of integration can be entered upon, a preliminary orientation is first called for. If a genetic phenomenology seeks to present the multiple possibilities of human consciousness in an ordered progression, it becomes a matter of the first importance to determine the correct point of departure for the genesis. If a teleological genesis starts out from the origin rather than moving back toward the origin, the question as to what constitutes the absolute origin can not be one the answer to which is either taken for granted or left indefinite.
The Point of Departure for a Phenomological Philosophy
From the standpoint of transcendental phenomenology, two possible points of departure spring to mind. First, the world of the natural attitude may be taken as a starting point, inasmuch as it is only by way of a placing in brackets of this world that a transcendental investigation first becomes possible. But although the world of the natural attitude may constitute a factual starting point, it can not offer one which is philosophically significant. If, on the other hand, the transcendental ego is taken to be the point of departure, it becomes impossible to account for the placement of consciousness upon a transcendental plane, and this despite the fact that it is the very un-naturalness of the transcendental stance which makes it necessary to appeal to the procedure of a phenomenological reduction.
A new start can be made by taking the cogito as the point of departure. In so doing, we should be following Sartre who never ceased to contend that the cogito has to constitute the proper point of departure for any fundamental investigation of human reality. To be sure, Sartre takes care to define his acceptance of the cogito in such a way that it avoids the Cartesian error of substance. Nevertheless, however self-evident it may appear, taking the cogito as the point of departure does, in fact, run counter to the entire thrust of contemporary ontology, an ontology which seeks precisely to overcome that limitation introduced into modern philosophy with the 'subjective turn'.
In a passage from the Introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger writes: 'Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein which as an analytic of existence has made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical enquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns.'
So, for Heidegger, it is the analytic of human existence which constitutes the point of departure. But what then has become of the question of the meaning of being in general? This is no idle question. For, in fact, the question of the meaning of being in general has been passed over, or rather, has been resolved within an alternative frame of reference. The question of being in general disappears to give way to a question with regard to the being of that being by way of which the being question first arises, and so only reappears in the derivative form of a being-in-the-world of human being. But in order to be in a better position to determine whether or not being-in-the-world offers a sufficiently primordial point of departure for an ontological phenomenology which claims to respond to the question of the meaning of being in general, we first need to consider, in more general terms, what might constitute the genuine primordiality of a point of departure.
First, the point of departure must be originary, in the sense that it uncovers an origin beyond which it is not possible to go back further. In other words, the point of departure which is supposed must be so constituted that it is not itself presupposed by anything else. If the Heideggerian ontology is not capable of responding to this demand, the reason is to be sought in the analytical regression which it puts into effect. As long as ontology -- even the ontology which prides itself in having moved beyond the limitations of traditional ontology and indeed precisely this ontology -- takes its start with things, or worse still, with objects present-at-hand, and then inquires back into the underlying ground of the being of such things, so long will ontology fail to get back to the true origin.
Second, the point of departure must also furnish an originary source, in the sense that it must be possible to develop the entire wealth of phenomenal material out of it. This means that, however undifferentiated the origin may prove to be, it must at least enjoy an unrestricted universality. Whatever is to be explicitly developed out of the origin must be implicitly present in the origin from the first. Inasmuch as the origin proves its fruitfulness as a source, it will already enjoy a certain provisional validity, the validity of a mathematical axiom from which certain valid theorems can be derived. But if this point of departure is not to remain merely hypothetical and, as such, constitute merely one among several other possible points of departure, something more is required than just such provisional validity.
In order that the provisionally valid point of departure be confirmed as the absolute origin and so as the only possible point of departure for an ontological phenomenology which adopts a genetic methodology, the goal of the whole process will have to be nothing other than a return to that very ground which was assumed at the outset. In so far as the linear directive of the progressive genesis is eventually converted into a circular form, the development which the genesis traces can not be just one among other possible developments but must be the only possible development which can arise on the basis of this ground. Not only is there a ground which is already presupposed by the Heideggerian principle of a being-in-the-world of human being, a ground which can at the same time serve as the goal of the entire genesis, this absolutely primordial ground is one which must be assumed if the question of the meaning of being in general is not to be divested of all real content. This absolutely originary ground is the being-in-being of human being. |
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